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Abstract
Entry barriers encourage competition “for” the market as opposed to
“in” the market. Eﬃcient entrants use penetrating strategies while ineﬃ-
cient incumbents harvest the market before leaving. These phenomenon
are explored in an infinite horizon game in which history matters. Under
some circumstances, higher entry barriers induce entry of eﬃcient firms
while lower entry barriers would not. This comes from the expected ben-
efit of future rents. Social welfare may be enhanced as well. This result
suggests that a rule of reason should be applied and that entry barriers
should not be considered per se anticompetitive.
1 Introduction
In many markets the consumer buys from only one producer (i.e. for goods
such as cars, electronic sets, banking accounts, insurance contracts, contracts
with utility or internet providers. . . ) and rarely changes from one producer to
another one when the good (or the contract) needs be renewed. That incum-
bent producer enjoys some extra profit due to the short term barrier (frictions
of various sorts, psychological bias, contract clauses, switching costs. . . ) that
limits competition. Is it to say that such markets are immune to potential
competition?
Consider the video game industry. The early developments illustrate a period
of intense short term competition with many bankruptcies followed by the emer-
gence of Nintendo as a dominant player. Nintendo deployed various strategies
to “lock in” the consumer (Sheﬀ, 1993). However, in a judgment pronounced
in 1992, the FTC declared that “lawyers would be more productively occupied
playing Super Mario 3 that bringing cases like this case” (see Nintendo HBS
case study, 1996). Further developments demonstrated that this judgment was
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well founded. Indeed new competitors such as Sony and Microsoft appeared in
that industry.
In markets such as these, competition is “for the market” rather than “in the
market”. The best way to compete is through innovation relative to the current
incumbent. Once a breakthrough occurs, a “penetrating” strategy is devised
leaving some opportunity for the current incumbent to “harvest” its market
share. One may argue that it is the expectation of the future profits that will
be generated by the short term entry barrier that creates the motivation of
potential entrants. If this is so it may be that some short term entry barrier
triggers dynamic eﬃciency and that this is good for social welfare?
The balance between short term and long term competition is a recur-
rent topic in industrial organization. For instance, it has been argued by
d’Aspremont and Motta (2000) that tough price competition may trigger a
higher concentration level in the industry, thus inducing a welfare loss. There
the degree of toughness is associated to either Bertrand or Cournot competition.
A similar point is made by Norman and Thisse (2000) comparing discriminatory
pricing with mill pricing in the context of spatial competition. In such models
the degree of concentration is endogenously determined through a free entry con-
dition. Historically, it seems that the enforcement of price competition indeed
induced concentration moves in many industries. This prompted the attention
of antitrust authorities to the analysis of mergers and market dominance.
There are also many models that explore the impacts of switching costs
and network eﬀects on short term and long term competition (see Farrell and
Klemperer, 2001, for a survey). Such models exhibit the fact that long term
competition is often more intense than it seems: firms may fiercely compete to
lock in the customers. The models can be explored to discuss the overall impact
on pricing, entry and social welfare. The general idea is that, not necessarily
but often, firms dissipate resources in creating and defending switching costs
and network eﬀects.
This paper is concerned with similar issues but with a major diﬀerence. The
social welfare analysis is on dynamic productive eﬃciency: what are the in-
centives for the firms to compete through relative cost advantage rather than
through defensive moves? It will be shown that the existence of short term entry
barrier may under some circumstances encourage dynamic productive eﬃciency.
Increasing the short term entry barrier makes the market potentially more prof-
itable thus triggers more long term competition to fight for the market. These
two eﬀects balance each other so that the incumbency rent appears as a bell
shaped function. Decreasing the short term entry barrier may then increase the
incumbent profit, and make it more diﬃcult to be dislodged by a more eﬃcient
competitor, which eventually discourages competition through cost advantage.
This result suggests that a rule of reason should be applied and that short term
entry barriers should not be considered per se anticompetitive.
That cost asymmetry matters in practice has been exemplified by a number
of illuminating case studies by Scherer (1992). There, whenever import barriers
are lowered, the domestic industry may either fight back or harvest its market
share depending on its relative cost position. At the more macro level, Aghion
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et ali. (2006) provide evidence that, as the rate of imports increases, the prof-
itability of the domestic firm may either increase or decrease depending again
on its position relative to the industry eﬃciency frontier. While Sherer analysis
is purely empirical, Aghion et ali. use a Schumpeterian model to justify their
result, which is a line of reasoning similar to the one developed here.
The argument of this paper is based on a model in which firms repeatedly
compete for a market. Price is used as the strategic variable. Firms can only
make short term price commitments. They maximize their total discounted
profits. Due to fixed cost relative to market size, only one firm may operate
with positive profit at any given stage. The analysis can be limited to only
two firms: the two most eﬃcient firms in the industry which repeatedly fight
for incumbency. The stage game has two pure price equilibria in anyone of
which one of the two firms features as an incumbent and the other one as an
entrant. The game is solved using a forward induction approach for extensive
games originally developed in Ponssard (1991). Forward induction has also been
used to study entry in other circumstances, see for instance Bagwell and Ramey
(1996) who investigate the role of excess capacity.
In a recent paper on switching costs, Biglaiser et ali. (2007) show that
reducing the level of switching cost may increase the incumbency rent. In their
stage model there are no fixed cost so that the equilibrium requires randomized
strategies. The solution concept used to select the equilibrium in the infinite
horizon game is also specific. The result is obtained whenever customers may
have either zero or an exogenously given switching cost. To the best of my
knowledge these are the only two papers in which it is shown that this bell
shaped property of the incumbency rent carries over from a two stage model
(which is known) to an infinite horizon model. That this can be the case provides
a strong ground to discuss the social welfare of short term entry barrier relative
to dynamic productive eﬃciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the competition model
under study, gives the equilibrium of the one stage game and provides the intu-
ition about the impact of introducing a longer time horizon. Section 3 details the
solution of the infinitely repeated game using forward induction as a selection
principle. The economic properties of that solution as a function of the short
term entry barriers are discussed in section 4. Diﬀerences with an approach
based on perfect Markov equilibra (Maskin and Tirole, 1988) are pointed out.
2 A simple economic model of dynamic compe-
tition with short term entry barriers
2.1 The model: an infinitely repeated stage game with
price competition and high fixed costs
The paper is mostly conceptual, the analysis will be carried on using a simple
competition model.
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Consider a situation in which two firms repeatedly compete for a market.
Let i ∈ {1, 2} be anyone of the two firms and j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i be the other
one. Each firm i incurs a fixed cost fi at each stage but only if it is active on
the market, i.e. if it delivers a strictly positive quantity. The fixed cost is not
a set up cost incurred once and for all at the beginning of the infinite stage
game. Firms diﬀer only in their fixed costs with f1 ≤ f2, so that firm 1 is
more eﬃcient than firm 2. If f1 = f2, this is the symmetric case, otherwise
it is the asymmetric case. Price is the decision variable and noted pi ∈ [0, 1].
Prices are set simultaneously at each stage, no long term price commitments
are allowed. For a given price pj of firm j the demand function of firm i, to be
noted di(pi, pj), is kinked using a positive constant parameter denoted s to be
interpreted as the short term entry barrier. More precisely, for i ∈ {1, 2}, we
have:
0 ≤ pi ≤ pj − s di(pi, pj) = 1− pi
pj − s ≤ pi ≤ pj + s di(pi, pj) = (pj − pi + s)(1− pj + s)/2s
pj + s ≤ pi ≤ 1 di(pi, pj) = 0
and the stage profit function writes:
πi(pi, pj) = pidi(pi, pj)− (1di 6=0)fi
The fixed costs are suﬃciently high so that only one firm may generate
positive profit at anyone stage. Firms maximize their discounted profits using
the same discount factor δ. The paper focuses on the role of the short term entry
barrier s and not on the role of the time commitment induced by the discount
factor δ. It is assumed that δ is close to 1.
2.2 Analysis of the one stage game: the equilibrium set
as a function of the short term entry barrier
For i ∈ {1, 2} denote the pure monopoly profit as πmi (pi) = pi(1− pi)− fi. Let
paci be the minimal price that solves π
m
i (pi) = 0. This price will referred to as
the average cost of firm i.
Define the best entry price of firm j to a price pi as the price that maximizes
its revenue pjdj(pi, pj). Denote pBEj (pi) this price. Simple calculations show
that:
0 ≤ pi ≤ 3s pBEj (pi) = (pi + s)/2
3s ≤ pi ≤ s+ 1/2 pBEj (pi) = pi − s
s+ 1/2 ≤ pi pBEj (pi) = 1/2
Define the one stage limit price pmaxi as the highest pi such that:
πj(pi, p
BE
j (pi)) ≤ 0.
Let pmini = Max(p
ac
i , 2s).
It is a simple matter to check that pmini ≤ pmaxi as long as fj ≥ 9s(1− s)/8
(or s ≤ .5− (.25− 8fj/9).5).
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Proposition 1 For i ∈ {1, 2} , if fj ≥ 9s(1− s)/8, for all pi ∈ [pmini , pmaxi ] the
set of prices [pi, pj = pi + s] is a pure Nash equilibrium.
For 0 ≤ s ≤ paci /2 it is clear that [pmini , pmaxi ] = [paci , pacj + s]. For paci /2 ≤
s ≤ .5− (.25− 8fj/9).5 then [pmini , pmaxi ] = [2s, pmaxi ] and the determination of
pmaxi requires some numerical calculations.
As firm 2 becomes less eﬃcient relative to firm 1, f2 increases, pmin2 increases
but pmax2 remains unaﬀected. For a large enough f2, p
min
2 > p
max
2 , firm 2 can
no longer be an incumbent.
For a given pair of fixed costs, f1 > f2, if s is small enough there is only one
set of pure Nash equilibria in which firm 1 is the incumbent (pmin1 ≤ pmax1 ), if
s is large enough there are two sets of pure Nash equilibria (pmin1 ≤ pmax1 and
pmin2 ≤ pmax2 ). The larger s the larger the incumbency rents. But, if s gwere too
large the regime of competition in the stage game would change to a randomized
equilibrium and, ultimately, to a duopoly in pure strategies. In the paper it is
assumed at all times that this does not occur, s remains small enough so that
at least pmin1 ≤ pmax1 .
2.3 The multi stage game: the competitive pressure in-
creases, the less eﬃcient firm harvests the market and
the more eﬃcient firm moves in
Suppose the game is repeated twice and investigate an equilibrium path in
which firm i would select p1i at the first stage and then p
2
i at the second stage. If
time matters the successive prices should be interdependent. Forward induction
captures very well this idea. It requires that firm j cannot deviate through
pBEj (p
1
i ) at the first stage to capture the second stage incumbency rent associated
to its preferred equilibrium payoﬀ πmj (p
max
j ). The competitive pressure in a two
stage is higher than in a one stage game (p1i ≤ p2i ).
The general results are as follows (Ponssard, 1991 and Gromb et ali., 1997):
- The range of equilibrium prices for p1i is now [p
min
i , p
2,max
i ] in which p
2,max
i
is the highest pi such that πj(pi, pBEj (pi)) + δπ
m
j (p
max
j ) ≤ 0.
- Even if pmin2 ≤ pmax2 it may very well be the case that pmin2 > p
2,max
2 ,
the less eﬃcient firm may be an incumbent in a one stage game but not in a
two stage game; if this is the case, there is an equilibrium path in which firm 2
first selects p2 = pmax2 and then it is firm 1 that is the incumbent at the second
stage with p1 = pmax1 . It is important to note that this equilibrium is not the
outcome of tacit collusion but the outcome of the inability of the less eﬃcient
firm to sustain long term incumbency when facing a more eﬃcient entrant. In a
qualitative sense it means that less eﬃcient firm benefits enough from the short
term entry barrier to extract some rent through a harvesting strategy, but not
enough to secure a long term incumbency advantage.
In this paper, equilibrium paths in the infinite horizon game are selected
so that such phenomenon are captured. The impacts of the short term entry
barrier are analyzed in details. Intuitively, the less short term competition (s
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large) the more intense long term competition, and the easier for a more eﬃcient
entrant to penetrate the market. If these intuitions are correct they would imply
that short term entry barriers would, under some circumstances, be beneficial
to trigger productive eﬃciency, i.e. to have the more eﬃcient firm as the long
term incumbent. The circumstances are important to be determined since, of
course, the best of all words would be to have no short term entry barriers, i.e.
s = 0.
3 The solution of the infinitely repeated game
Some preliminary comments are in order. Thanks to the folk theorem, the set
of perfect Nash equilibria of the repeated game is extremely large. As motivated
in the preceding section, the idea is to use forward induction as a selection
process. This will be done in a loose way through the direct proposal of a
subset of perfect equilibria that captures the idea, rather than from a deductive
process from general principles. This is so because there is no formal definition of
forward induction for finite extensive games and, a fortiori, for infinite extensive
ones.
The two firms are arbitrarily distinguished as a long term firm, denoted as
firm L, and a short term firm, denoted as firm S. At this point no assumption
is made regarding the relative eﬃciency of the two firms, though one should
associate the long term firm with the more eﬃcient firm and the short term
firm with the less eﬃcient one.
The proposed solution selects two equilibria that generate two equilibrium
paths. One equilibrium path is such that firm L stays as a permanent incumbent
with a price pL = qL. The other equilibrium path is such that firm S stays
as an incumbent for a finite number of stages, n, with a sequence of prices
(ptS = q
t
S)t=1,..n and then firm L becomes the incumbent for ever with a price
pL = qL. Clearly, firm L prefers the first path and firm S the second path.
These two paths reinforce each other through a forward induction argument in
the following sense. Suppose the first path is played and firm S is unhappy.
It could play pBES (qL) to signal that the game should from now on proceed
along the second path. Along the equilibrium path it should be that such a
deviation be unprofitable. And vice versa for firm L. In this way the two paths
are constructed through a unique interdependent procedure.
The complete the strategy for each firm one needs to precise what to do in
case of deviation. The following rule is adopted. If an incumbent prices at a
higher price than the one corresponding to the proposed path or the entrant at
a price below its stage best response then the game actually proceeds along the
path in which it is the entrant which becomes the incumbent. Other deviations
such as pricing below the proposed price for the incumbent or selecting any price
above its stage best response for the entrant have no influence on the path, it
stays exactly on track.
Altogether, the game may start with either one of the two firms as an in-
cumbent but, after at most n stages, how it started is irrelevant, firm L is the
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incumbent for ever.
It is now shown that the proposed equilibria can be obtained through the
solution of a system to be denoted Φnδ . For an integer n, if they exist, define the
real numbers qL and (qtS)t=0,..n that solves the following system:
for t ∈ {0, 1, 2...n} πL(pBEL (qtS), qtS) + δ(1− δn−t)πmL (qL)/(1− δ) = 0 (1)
πS(p
BE
S (qL), qL) +Σt=nt=1 δ
tπmS (q
t
S) = 0 (2)
πmL (qL) ≥ 0 (3)
for t ∈ {1, 2...n} Σt0=nt0=t δt
0−tπmS (q
t0
S ) ≥ 0 (4)
Σt0=nt0=0 δ
t0πmS (q
t0
S ) < 0 (5)
The interpretation is the following:
Equation (1) means that firm L is patient enough to let firm S harvest
the market before penetrating it. It would cost −πL(pBEL (qtS), qtS) to move the
game to the preferred path of firm L generating an incremental discounted
profit exactly equal to δ(1− δn−t)πmL (qL)/(1− δ) so that such a deviation is not
profitable. The term πmL (qL) will be called the incumbency rent.
Equation (2) takes the point of view of firm S . There is no point to challenge
the incumbency of firm L to capture the total discounted profit associated with
a harvesting strategy. The term Σt=nt=1 δtπmS (qtS) will be called the harvesting
benefit.
Inequations (3) and (4) stands for individual rationality: the incumbency
rent is positive and the harvesting benefit remains positive at all stages.
Inequation (5) means that the strategy of firm S is indeed a harvesting
strategy of duration n. It would not be profitable for firm S to harvest on a
duration n+ 1.
Proposition 2 If it exists, the solution of system Φnδ defines two perfect equi-
libria for the infinitely repeated game.
System Φnδ is precisely constructed to make any deviation from the paths
unprofitable. The proof is omitted.
A number of general propositions can be proved and generalized to other
demand functions than the ones introduced in section 2.1 (these proofs are in
the appendix).
Proposition 3 The system Φnδ has at most one solution for δ close enough to
1.
More can be said about this solution. Condition (1) implies that the sequence
(qtS)
t=n
t=0 is strictly increasing in t. The following property holds.
Proposition 4 If, for m > n, Φmδ and Φnδ have both one solution, the longer
the duration of the harvesting strategy, the higher its associated benefit.
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This implies that the system Φnδ indeed defines what one would intuitively
expect from a harvesting strategy: an increasing sequence of prices and direct
links between the pressure of the entrant, the duration of the harvesting strategy
and the benefit that can be associated with that strategy. In the context of this
game it is natural to focus on the most profitable harvesting strategy (i.e. the
longest duration n such that Φnδ has one solution).
It remains to be seen whether the proposed solution is not empty. Because
the solution involves integers, it may not exist for very small values of n. Nu-
merical analysis shows for instance that for a discount factor equal to 1 and not
too much asymmetry in costs the system Φn1 has one solution for n ≥ 3. The
existence of an upper bound for n can be precisely characterized.
Proposition 5 Define q∗S such that
R p=qmaxS
p=q∗S
πmS (p)d[πL(p
BE
L (p), p)] = 0, the
system Φn1 has one solution for all values of n if only if πmS (q∗S)+πS(pBES (pacL ), pacL ) ≤
0. Then limn→∞ qL = pacL and limn→∞ q
1
S = q
∗
S .
However, as soon as δ < 1, the is always an upper bound for n.
Proposition 6 If δ < 1,∃nδ such that ∀n > nδ,Φnδ has no solution.
These last two propositions provide a link with the traditional rent dissi-
pation result for symmetric entry games (Wilson, 1992). This point will be
discussed later on.
4 Discussion: more short term entry barrier may
be better than less
4.1 Main results
It is now shown that the incumbency rent is bell shaped as a function of the
short term entry barrier. The discussion will proceed in two steps. Firstly the
solution for δ = 1 is considered. Secondly, the role of the discount factor is
introduced. System Φnδ cannot be solved analytically. However it can be solved
numerically.
Fig. 1 gives the incumbency rent as a function of s for three cost configura-
tions: one symmetric and two asymmetric.
- case 1: fL = fS = .16
The relevant range for s is (see proposition 1): 0 ≤ s ≤ .5− (.25− 8f/9).5 =
.17
The fact that the rent is bell shaped illustrates that this solution provides a
balance between short term and long term competition: for s small short term
competition is tough, the incumbency position is not worth very much and the
pressure to get it is moderate, altogether there is room for some rent. For s
large short term competition is smooth, the incumbency position is worth a lot
and the pressure to get it is intense, altogether there is no room for rent.
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Figure 1: The incumbency rent is bell shaped
- case 2: fL = .158; fS = .16
The incumbency rent is higher, it pays for the long term firm to be more
eﬃcient.
- case 3: fL = .16; fS = .158
The incumbency rent of the long term firm decreases when the short term
firm becomes more eﬃcient. It becomes zero for s small or for s large: the short
term firm would stay indefinitely if it were to enter.
From a policy perspective, a situation in which s = .14 is preferable to
a situation in which s = .08. Indeed with s = .14 the rent for a historical
ineﬃcient incumbent is zero so that it would certainly prefer to use a harvesting
strategy. This is not the case with s = .08, there its equilibrium price is p = .210.
With s = .14 the eﬃcient incumbent will select an equilibrium price that can
be computed to be p = .208. This proves that the consumer is better oﬀ. The
model illustrates a nice Shumpeterian process: the less eﬃcient incumbent is
eliminated by the more eﬃcient one and both the more eﬃcient firm and the
consumer benefit from the process.
The bell shaped nature of the incumbency rent provides some protection for
an ineﬃcient historical incumbent. This protection is the highest the closest s
is to the value that gives the maximal rent. In industries in which innovation
comes from breakthrough, this protection may not be so important, a much
more eﬃcient entrant will make its way to the market, but in industries in
which innovation is more incremental it could pay to increase s!
By continuity, the arguments remain true for δ close to 1. It is interesting to
quantify this continuity property. It has been proved that as soon as δ < 1 the
incumbency rent can no longer be equal to zero (n is bounded). Fig. 2 depicts
this rent for δ = .98. It can be observed that enlarging the commitment period
(i.e. decreasing δ) strongly mitigates the power of long term competition. As
might be expected it is for large values of s that the impact is the largest because
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Figure 2: The role of the discount factor
this coincides with the zone in which the power of long term competition is at
its peak.
This model also provides a theory of limit pricing which is consistent for
all values of cost asymmetry. This is illustrated with δ = 1. Take the one
stage game with s = .1, fL = .16 and let fS vary from .1 to .23. Firm L is
blockaded from entry with fS = .1 but no longer is with fS = .11, in which case
pmaxL = .215 > p
ac
L = .2. The static limit price increases as a function of fS .
Observe that for fS > .21, it is firm S which is blockaded from entry. Fig. 3
depicts the equilibrium price of firm L as fS increases from .11 to .21. One can
see that it increases from firm L average cost to its static limit price pmaxL .
4.2 Long term competition is over weighted with perfect
Markov equilibria
These results are very diﬀerent from what would be obtained using a perfect
Markov equilibria. To construct such an equilibria one needs to modify the
game form. Suppose that at each stage firms move in sequence: firstly the
incumbent at the previous stage if it were unchallenged, in the reverse order if
it were challenged (the results would remain true with an alternate game form
such as the one used in Maskin and Tirole, 1988). Let p∗1 and p
∗
2 be the solution
the following system of two equations:
−C1(p2) + δπm1 (p1)/(1− δ) = 0
−C2(p1) + δπm2 (p2)/(1− δ) = 0
Proposition 7 The perfect Markov equilibrium strategies are as follows: any
of the two firms, say firm i, remains the incumbent for ever with pi = p∗i ; the
reaction function of the outsider, say firm j 6= i, is such that if pi > p∗i then
pj = p
BE
j (p
∗
i ) but if pi ≤ p∗i then pj = p∗i + s.
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Figure 3: The dynamic limit price of firm L as a function of fS
This solution has two striking features which make it unappealing from an
economic point of view: firstly, limδ→1 p∗i = p
ac
i , the pressure of long term
competition eliminates the role of cost asymmetry, secondly, for δ close to 1,
the incumbency rent of the less eﬃcient firm is greater than the one the more
eﬃcient one would get as an incumbent (for more details, see Lahmandi et ali.,
1996).
This solution concept puts too much pressure on long term competition (see
Fig. 4).
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6 Appendix : Proofs
Proof. 1 (Proposition 3) The proof is given for δ = 1. The argument can be
extended to δ close to 1 by continuity. Define the system Φn1 as the limit of Φnδ
as δ goes to 1. It is easily seen that the system Φn1 is
for t ∈ {0, 1, 2...n} πL(pBEL (qtS), qtS) + (n− t)πmL (qL) = 0 (10)
πS(p
BE
S (qL), qL) +Σt=nt=1πmS (qtS) = 0 (20)
πmL (qL) ≥ 0 (30)
for t ∈ {1, 2...n} Σt0=nt0=t πmS (qt
0
S ) ≥ 0 (40)
Σt0=nt0=0πmS (qt
0
S ) < 0 (5
0)
The proof runs as follows. Firstly prove that conditions (1’-2’-3’-4’) of Φn1
have a unique solution. Secondly, check whether condition (5’) is satisfied: if it
is, the unique solution of Φn1 is obtained; if it is not, Φn1 has no solution. To
simplify notations, for i ∈ {1, 2}, define the function Ci(pj) = −πi(pBEi (pj), pj).
This function Ci may be interpreted as the entry cost for firm i. It will be con-
venient to assume that the fixed costs are small enough so that the functions πmi
and Ci are respectively strictly increasing and strictly decreasing over the rel-
evant values of prices, i.e. one never needs to consider prices above 1/2.To
prove the first part, for all pL ∈ [pacL , pmaxL ] , define the function W (pL) =
CS(pL) − Σn1πmS (ptS) in which the sequence (ptS) is derived from pL through
(1’) that is,
−CL(ptS) + (n− t)πmL (pL) = 0 for t ∈ {0, 1, 2...n}
then, show that W (pL) is negative (step 1) then positive (step 2) and that its
derivative is strictly positive (step 3) so that there is a unique solution to the
equation W (pL) = 0.
Step 1: if pL = pacL then W (pL) < 0. In that case p
t
S = C
−1
L (0) = p
max
S for
all t so that W (pacL ) = CS (p
ac
L ) − nπmS (pmaxS ) . By assumption πmS (pmaxS ) > 0
so that for n large enough W (pacL ) < 0.
Step 2: if pL = pmaxL then W (pL) > 0. Since CL is strictly decreasing, the
sequence (ptS) is a strictly increasing sequence bounded by p
max
S . Since π
m
S is
strictly increasing this implies that Σn1πmS (ptS) is certainly negative for n large
enough so that W (pmaxL ) = −Σn1πmS (ptS) is certainly positive.
Step 3: dWdpL > 0. We have
dW
dpL
= dCSdpL − Σ
t=n
t=1 (
dπmS
dptS
· dptSdpL ). Using (1’) we get:
dptS
dpL
= (n− t)dπ
m
L
dpL
/
dCL
dptS
By substitution it follows that:
dW
dpL
=
dCS
dpL
− dπ
m
L
dpL
Σt=nt=1 ((n− t)
dπmS
dptS
/
dCL
dptS
)
By assumption −dπ
m
S
dptS
/
dCL
dptS
is uniformly bounded away from zero by ε so that
1 I am indebted to Rida Laraki for providing the argument for this proof.
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dW
dpL
≥ dCS
dpL
+
dπmL
dpL
n(n− 1)
2
ε
Since
dπmL
dpL
is bounded away from zero and since
dCS
dpL
is bounded away from
−∞ we certainly have dW
dpL
> 0 for n large enough. Hence for a given n large
enough there is a unique solution to W (pL) = 0 that is, to (2’). This solution
is in ]pacL , p
max
L [ so that (3’) is also satisfied. Denote qL this solution and (q
t
S)
for t ∈ {0, 1, 2...n} the associated sequence obtained through (1’). Observe that
(4’) is satisfied as well : since πmS is increasing the function Σt
0=n
t0=t π
m
S (q
t0
S ) is bell
shaped with respect to t so for all t we have:
Σt
0=n
t0=t π
m
S (q
t0
S ) ≥Min(Σn1πmS (qtS),πmS (qnS)) =Min(CS(qL),πmS (qmaxS ) > 0
because qL < pmaxL implies CS(qL) > 0 and π
m
L (p
max
L ) > 0 by construction.
It is now a simple matter to check whether (5’) holds or not. If it does a complete
solution to Φn1 is obtained, if it does not there cannot be a solution for that value
of n since conditions (1’) through (4’) have a unique solution.
Proof. (Proposition 4) Suppose qL(m, δ) > qL(n, δ) then πmL (yL(m, δ)) >
πmL (qL(n, δ)). Since CL is strictly decreasing this implies for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2...n}:
qm−tS (m, δ) < q
n−t
S (n, δ)
so that
Σt=0t=nδn−tπmS (qm−tS (m, δ)) < Σ
t=0
t=nδ
n−tπmS (q
n−t
S (n, δ)).
For t ∈ {n+ 1, ..m} we still have qm−tS (m, δ) < q0S(n, δ) and, because of (5)
we also certainly have πmS (q
0
S(n, δ)) < 0 then
Σt=0t=m−1δm−1−tπmS (qm−tS (m, δ)) ≤ Σt=0t=nδ
n−tπmS (q
m−t
S (m, δ)).
Then
Σt=0t=m−1δm−1−tπmS (qm−tS (m, δ)) < Σt=0t=nδ
n−tπmS (q
n−t
S (n, δ)).
By construction the left hand side should be greater or equal to zero while
the right hand side should be strictly negative thus a contradiction.
Proof. (Proposition 5) The intuition for this proof is the following. If n
can be arbitrarily large it must be that the corresponding qL be close to average
cost. Then the sequence (qtS)t=1...n generate a total payoﬀ that is proportional
to
R pmaxS
q1S
πmS (p)
dCL
dp (p)dp.Conditions (4) and (5) imply that this integral be zero.
This allows the precise determination of lim q1S and the condition π
m
S (q
∗
S) +
πS(p
BE
S (p
ac
L ), p
ac
L ) ≤ 0 holds.
If Φn1 has a solution for arbitrarily large n, clearly limn→∞ πmL (qL(n)) = 0.
Combining this result with (2’) we get limn→∞Σn1πmS (qtS(n)) = CS(pacL ).
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Given that dCLdp is bounded away from infinity and from zero and that π
m
S (p)
is bounded away from zero, there exists a unique q∗ < pacS such thatZ pmaxS
p∗
πmS (p)
dCL
dp
(p)dp = 0
For all p ≤ p1,maxS define F (p) =
R p1,maxS
p
πmS (u)
dCL
du (u)du, the function F is
such that F (x) > 0 iﬀ p < q∗.
We now show the convergence of q1S(n) to q
∗.
Using (1’) and (2’) we get :
CS(qL(n))π
m
L (qL(n)) = Σt=nt=1πmS (qtS(n))πmL (qL(n))
= Σt=nt=1πmS (qtS(n))
£
CL
¡
qt−1S (n)
¢
− CL
¡
qtS(n)
¢¤
When πmL (qL(n) is small this non negative expression is close to F (q
1
S(n)).
To see this, make the change of variable from pS to u = CL (pS) . As t goes
from 1 to n, pS increases from q1S(n) to q
n
S(n) and u from u
1(n) = CL
¡
q1S(n)
¢
to
un(n) = CL (q
n
S(n)) = 0 but u
t−1(n)− ut(n) remains t independent and equals
πmL (qL(n)), let ∆u(n) = πmL (qL(n)).
We may then write
πmL (qL(n))Σt=nt=1πmS (qtS(n)) = Σt=nt=1πmS (C−1L (u
t(n)))∆u(n)
For large values of n we have
Σt=nt=1πmS (C−1L (u
t(n)))∆u(n) ≈
Z 0
u1(n)
πmS (C
−1
L (u))du =
Z pmaxS
q1S(n)
πmS (p)
dCL
dp
(p)dp.
This proves that q1S(n) cannot be far below q
∗. Using (2’) and (5’) for
the two sequences n and n + 1, it is clear that q1S(n + 1) and q
1
S(n) cannot be
far apart either. More precisely:
¯¯
q1S(n+ 1)− q1S(n)
¯¯
≤ −Min(dCL
dp
(q1S(n)),
dCL
dp
(q0S(n)))π
m
L (qL(n))
Since dCLdp is bounded away from infinity, limn→∞
¯¯
q1S(n+ 1)− q1S(n)
¯¯
= 0,
this is enough to prove that q1S(n) converges to some limit and this limit can
only be q∗ since
limn→∞CS(qL(n))π
m
L (qL(n)) = limn→∞CS(qL(n)) limn→∞ π
m
L (qL(n))
= CS(0).0 = 0.
Proof. (Proposition 6) Consider the symmetric case with δ < 1 and assume
the system Φnδ has a solution for arbitrarily large values of n. Using conditions
(1) and (2), it is easily seen that, as n→∞, lim q1S = lim q0S = δπmL (qL)/(1− δ).
Hence conditions (4) and (5) cannot be simultaneously satisfied.
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